[🇬🇧] What Allies' Contributions to France’s Forward Deterrence?
[Forward deterrence] is a progressive approach. It offers, first of all, the possibility for partners to participate in deterrence exercises. It may also involve signalling, including beyond our strict borders, or conventional participation of allies’ forces in our nuclear activities. It will finally involve the temporary deployment of elements of our strategic air forces to allied countries.
Since their inception over sixty years ago, France’s strategic forces have trained to conduct nuclear operations with complete autonomy, ensuring that—whatever the circumstances—they can guarantee the President of the Republic the ability to order a nuclear strike against any aggressor threatening the country’s vital interests. This autonomous capability is set to endure. However, the speech delivered by Emmanuel Macron on March 2, 2026, at Île Longue marks a major shift, paving the way for certain allies to participate in France’s most sensitive and sovereign operations under a new concept called “forward deterrence.”
This is by no means an admission of weakness, but rather a powerful signal of European cohesion sent to our competitors. Such arrangements already exist within NATO, with at least eleven European states actively participating in the Alliance’s nuclear operations—whether through the deployment of U.S. B61 nuclear bombs on dual-capable aircraft (DCA) and/or through conventional support for nuclear operations, known in NATO as CSNO . While this frees up U.S. capabilities for other missions, it in no way diminishes Washington’s ability to conduct nuclear operations independently, and thus the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Above all, it is a political signal. The same will hold true for France.
Competent Partners
In his speech, Emmanuel Macron named eight close allies with whom France has initiated a dialogue on nuclear deterrence: the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark. Among these, four are nations operating DCA: the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, and Germany. They will soon be joined by the United Kingdom, which recently announced its intention to acquire F-35A aircraft for this mission. This means that the air forces of these countries already possess solid experience in the deployment of nuclear weapons, which could prove invaluable for future cooperation with France, as we will see below. The other three nations—Poland, Sweden, and Denmark—contribute to CSNO missions, in which they regularly train, particularly during NATO’s annual Steadfast Noon exercise.
It is noteworthy that the first eight states supporting the French initiative are among those most involved in NATO’s nuclear operations, as they are best placed to assess the credibility of France’s security offer.
This initiative will complement, rather than replace, NATO’s nuclear mission. It differs on one significant point: only French fighter-bombers—the Rafale aircraft of the Air Strategic Forces (FAS) and the Naval Nuclear Force (FANu)—will deploy French nuclear weapons. Even though a partner state, Greece, operates Rafale aircraft, there is, for now, no question of a “French-style DCA.” Allied contributions will focus on conventional support and the provision of infrastructure.
Deterrence Exercises
This is the first step in the gradual approach outlined by the President to involve allies in France’s nuclear operations. As noted, all eight states are already familiar with nuclear operations within NATO. However, these operations differ significantly from those conducted by France. The means employed are of a different nature: within NATO, the equipment is primarily U.S.-made, centered on the B61 bomb. The B61 is a gravity bomb, meaning the carrier aircraft must approach within a few kilometers of its target, raising questions about the survivability of the carrier in the event of an attack on a heavily defended target. The gradual introduction of the stealthy F-35A fighter-bomber into U.S. and DCA nations’ inventories has restored some credibility to NATO’s nuclear mission. Nevertheless, stealth does not equal invisibility or invincibility; substantial conventional support and theater shaping remain essential to enable the nuclear-armed aircraft to approach a heavily defended target. For France, the challenge is very different. Rather than a large-scale operation, a nuclear strike by the FAS and/or FANu is more of a “hit and run” mission, with Rafale aircraft reaching a launch point potentially hundreds of kilometers from their target—beyond the range of the vast majority of current and near-term air defense systems. This is made possible by the range of the supersonic, nuclear-capable ASMPA-R missile. This operational mode of action therefore requires fewer escort and support aircraft.
Joint exercises will thus accustom allied air forces to the specifics of French nuclear operations, possibly first by playing the role of adversary (“red team”) before gradually being integrated into the most critical phases of the mission.
Strategic Signaling
The next level of cooperation is strategic signaling. This type of activity aims to demonstrate France’s determination to protect its interests, “fully factoring in the interests of [its] allies”, including, if necessary, by leveraging its nuclear forces. Different types of activities can mark this determination, depending on the stage of the crisis.
The nuclear air component (CNA) is the tool of choice for these signaling operations. Its flexibility and visibility allow for “gesticulation” and offer escalation management options without resorting to kinetic operations. Many signals already exist to indicate a gradual increase in tension to an adversary, such as recalling all combat aircraft to French soil, moving nuclear weapons from storage to the aircraft, or dispersing aircraft to air bases across France.
With the “forward deterrence” concept, strategic signaling takes on a European, rather than purely national, dimension. While FAS aircraft have been deployed abroad on numerous occasions, officially these were conventional missions. From now on, any FAS deployment to the territory of France’s partner states will have a nuclear dimension. In peacetime, this could involve flights without real weapons. Carrying ASMPA-R mock-ups could offer significant opportunities for both strategic signaling and training. Images of Rafale aircraft equipped with ASMPA-R mock-ups on allied territory would visually underscore the link between that state and French deterrence. Operationally, this would also allow the host country’s armed forces to train in the highly specific and strict procedures surrounding French nuclear weapons. Here, the experience of DCA states will be invaluable and enable faster skill development. Thus, in wartime or during a major crisis, military personnel in these countries would be able to receive and sustain FAS Rafale aircraft equipped with real nuclear munitions over the long term. Only such preparation in peacetime will ensure the operational effectiveness of “forward deterrence.”
Finally, while the CNA is the primary tool for strategic signaling, it is not the only one—even abroad. In 2022, the oceanic nuclear component (CNO) demonstrated a certain signaling capability through discreet but notable communication about the simultaneous deployment of three Triomphant-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the future, it could be envisaged that French SSBNs visit foreign ports, with Faslane—the home port of British SSBNs—at the top of the list. In a major crisis, Faslane could also serve as a fallback base.
Lastly, note that the first example of European-scale strategic signaling may have come from the least expected component, the FANu, with the deployment of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to Malmö, Sweden. While the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board is never confirmed, the timing of this deployment—coinciding with the March 2 speech—might not be coincidental.
Allied Conventional Participation in Nuclear Operations
The conventional participation of allies in French nuclear operations is the final step in the gradual approach presented by the President. This involves not just training, but active participation in wartime. It can serve three purposes:
Demonstrate European cohesion, including in the nuclear dimension of a crisis;
Distribute the risk of adversary retaliation, including nuclear retaliation, reducing the risk of coercion targeting France alone and complicating adversary planning by requiring them to deter multiple states rather than just one, thus necessitating more nuclear weapons;
Enhance the survival and penetration capabilities of French strategic forces.
The first two points are self-explanatory, allowing us to focus on the third.
While French strategic forces are capable of operating fully autonomously, their effectiveness could be further enhanced by allies providing capabilities that are limited or absent in French inventories. These include:
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD): The French Air and Space Force no longer possesses anti-radiation missiles following the retirement of the Martel missile in the late 1990s, nor does it have escort jammers to neutralize adversary radars. A rudimentary capability persists thanks to the Rafale’s SPECTRA electronic warfare system, which provides self-protection jamming, coupled with the AASM glide bomb, capable of destroying an unidentified adversary emitter. However, the system is not optimized for escort missions, and the weapon’s range does not allow it to stay outside the engagement bubble of long-range systems like the Russian S-400 or Chinese HQ-9. This capability gap is expected to be addressed by 2035 with the introduction of an anti-radiation version of the MBDA RJ-10 supersonic missile and an escort jamming pod for the Rafale F5 standard. However, several states involved in the French deterrence initiative are already or will soon be equipped with U.S.-made AGM-88 anti-radiation missiles, including the latest AGM-88G with significantly extended range, fulfilling this mission for the coming decade. Meanwhile, Germany is set to receive a specialized electronic warfare version of the Eurofighter by 2030.
Stealth: All eight states mentioned in the March 2 speech have committed to acquiring F-35A stealth fighter-bombers (and the F-35B for the UK). While France has long prioritized speed over stealth, recent conflicts—most notably the current one between the U.S., Israel, and Iran—have demonstrated the value of having a number of stealth aircraft for first-entry strike missions, especially in heavily defended environments. Their low radar signature and advanced radar and electro-optical sensors allow them to operate at high altitude and detect air and ground threats at very long range. These capabilities can turn these aircraft into true observation towers for the strike package, which itself operates at very low altitude, below adversary radar horizons but potentially blind to threats along its route. Thus, allied stealth aircraft could take over from the E-3F AWACS command aircraft participating in the raid but necessarily remaining far behind during the penetration phase, facing increasingly long-range adversary air and ground engagement bubbles.
As with SEAD, stealth is expected to enter the French Air Force at the end of the next decade with the arrival of the combat drone derived from Dassault’s Neuron. Its characteristics and capabilities—whether air-to-ground only or multirole—are not yet known. The participation of allied F-35s in FAS training or operations would allow the latter to become familiar with the opportunities offered by stealth, thus paving the way for the future stealth drone or the potential next-generation fighter aircraft (NGF).
Allies could also contribute to reinforcing capabilities present in the French inventory, but sometimes in limited numbers, such as aerial refueling or conventional escort. Allied Gripen and Eurofighter aircraft, for example, could relieve the fleet of Rafale and Mirage 2000D from conventional squadrons, allowing the FAS Rafale to focus on nuclear weapon delivery.
These conventional support measures become even more relevant in the event of FAS Rafale dispersal to allied territory during a major crisis. This would provide numerous elementary units centered around nuclear-armed Rafale dispersed across Europe, limited only by the number of available ASMPA-R missiles. These units would have two main advantages:
Force the adversary to consider neutralizing a considerable number of potential deployment bases if it wishes to launch a surprise attack, becoming a planning nightmare and de facto increasing the resilience of the FAS;
Diversify potential penetration axes, forcing the adversary to disperse its defensive assets along the entire eastern flank of Europe.
Conventional Rafale, or even those of the Greek Air Force, could also play a deception role by carrying ASMPA-R mock-ups during a crisis, with frequent changes of location, further complicating the adversary’s task of determining where the real weapons are located—a kind of continent-wide shell game.
Allied support for French nuclear operations may not be limited to the CNA, but could also extend to the CNO, particularly for the close or distant protection of French SNLEs against anti-submarine threats, both above and below the sea. Several countries already possess, or will soon acquire, assets that could contribute to this mission, at a time when the French Navy is already overstretched given the current geostrategic context.
Conclusion
While the “advanced deterrence” concept still requires in-depth reflection to determine all its benefits and potential risks, its implementation can already be realized without significant investment. It will be a powerful tool for political cohesion among the states participating in the French initiative, while also strengthening the resilience and effectiveness of French strategic forces. In the more distant future, further steps toward deeper cooperation could be added, such as a DCA capability similar to NATO’s. One can only regret the likely end of the joint combat aircraft program SCAF, which would have enabled Germany to operate an aircraft natively capable of carrying French nuclear weapons.